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The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the major inter-
national financial issues of current importance in the provision of
foreign economic assistance to the less developed countries (LDcs).
These issues are to be seen against a background of increasing
criticism of foreign aid, especially in the United States where the aid
proponents have experienced difficulties in convincing Congress that
aid is observedly a catalyst to development and that it is in the
interests of the United States to become heavily involved via the
aid programme in the internal affairs of recipient countries. The
questioning of foreign-aid commitments in the United States and
elsewhere has been reflected in the fact that there have been only
modest increases in official aid disbursements especially since 1961.
These developments have occurred despite the widely held belief
that many L D Cs could effectively use more aid. They have also come
at a time when there are signs of mounting debt-service require-
ments that particular L D Cs may find hard to meet in the near future.
In what follows, we shall focus in particular in Section i upon the
programmes of Development Assistance Committee (D A C) mem-
bers, giving special attention to the policy issues arising out of
bilateralism in aid giving, the emphasis on project financing, tied
aid, surplus commodity aid, and special problems created by the
increased use of suppliers' credits. We shall then treat briefly in
Sections Ii-iv some of the important financial characteristics of the
assistance programmes of the centrally planned economies, policies of
the multilateral institutions, and policies of the recipient countries.
Attention is directed in Section v to possible new directions in
development assistance policies especially with regard to aid tying,
suppliers' credits, and debt rescheduling. Some brief concluding re-
marks are given in Section vi.
I. DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES
The predominance of bilateral assistance
In recent years the D A C countries have disbursed on a bilateral basis
about 80 per cent of the total net official flow of long-term financial
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resources to the L D CS.1 This percentage would be even greater if
account were taken in addition of total net private long-term flows.
This 80 per cent figure is in a sense an overstatement, however,
because it does not reflect adequately the influences which inter-
national agencies have had on the flow of resources by their sharing
of experiences, the studies they have made of development problems
and the need for and the utilization of development finance, and the
discussions and recommendations they have sparked. These institu-
tions have also played a more direct role in affecting bilateral flows
by influencing the sizable commitments which have been made in
recent years through the activities of aid consortia and in the debt
reschedulings which have been arranged for a number of LD CS.
It remains nevertheless that national interests are still and will
continue to be reflected significantly in the assistance efforts of donor
countries. This is borne out by the preferences which individual
donors show for the financing of projects rather than programmes,
the frequency with which they tie their aid through procurement re-
strictions, and the importance especially for the United States of
surplus commodity aid, the substantial variation which exists in the
terms on which assistance is extended, and the special incentives
which are provided to encourage the expansion of exports.
Project and programme assistance
There has been a longstanding preference in both bilateral and
multilateral assistance programmes for the financing of specific pro-
jects in developing countries. Thus, the preponderance of multi-
lateral commitments is stipulated for project financing. According to
the data in table 1, which cover the distribution by purpose of
official bilateral assistance programmes, about 31 per cent of bilateral
commitments in 1965 was made for capital-project financing.
Although about 42 per cent was apparently allocated for non-project
(i.e., programme) assistance, it should be pointed out that only
9 per cent was in the form of freely usable foreign exchange. The
other 33 per cent evidently reflected in great part United States
surplus agricultural commodity shipments. However, since these
shipments are to some extent directed to consumption uses that have
been especially created in response to the availability of surplus-
commodity aid, the recorded contribution to programme finance
would appear to be somewhat overstated.
There is a preference for project financing on the part of donors
because projects deal with ostensibly tangible investments which
produce recognizable returns. They can be subjected therefore to
careful costing in terms especially of the amount of foreign exchange
which may be necessary to fulfill specific equipment needs and to


























































































































31-2 0-6 9-0 33-4 17-5 4.3 4-1 100-0
1 Gross disbursements.
2Non-project assistance not directly linked with imports.
3 lncludes contributions in kind and agricultural surplus commodity shipments.
4 Comprises mainly payments by Belgium of the interest and amortization of the external Congolese debt and reparations
payments of Germany, Italy, and Japan.
Source: Q E C D The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-Developed Countries, 1961-65 (Paris 1967) p. 228.
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supply technical personnel and other requisites. They may also
permit leverage to be exerted on the recipient through the financial
discipline which the external financing will involve and by requiring
a certain proportion of the investment to be met from local re-
sources. Projects can furthermore be tailored by the donor countries
to coincide with their particular export availabilities and at times to
further their national prestige.
Project financing may have definite advantages to developing
countries for reasons that are similar to some of those just mentioned.
But there are drawbacks as well. This is especially the case if projects
are defined too narrowly. Insufficient account may be taken therefore
of the need for additional resources to finance expansion in other
sectors and to satisfy increases generally in demand as income rises.
It is also possible that distortions will be created if projects are
financed subject to donor-country procurement specifications or to
further donor-country prestige, and inadequate attention is given to
development priorities, technical skills, and other resource availabili-
ties in the developing country's economy. The reluctance to finance
the local costs of projects may produce still further distortions by
increasing the capital intensity of investment, forcing the recipient
to turn to more costly external financing alternatives, and creating
greater pressure on the recipient to resort to deficit financing.
There is a tendency, moreover, for project finance to be con-
centrated on relatively large investments. The consequence of this
may be to retard the expansion of small-scale investment which does
not lend itself readily to project financing but which nevertheless
contributes importantly to development. It may be mentioned, finally,
that the time consumed in project implementation and negotiation
may slow down the utilization in the developing country of aid re-
sources in general and thus have a retarding effect on growth.
Because projects have characteristics which lend themselves to
discrete financing decisions, they will continue to be the main
objects of external development finance. The prerequisite for pro-
gramme financing is apparently a carefully drafted and consistent
plan for the execution and financing of the recipient's development
programme. The advantage of such a plan is the assurance that
adequate consideration will be given by the recipient to provisions
for overall growth, price stability, and balance-of-payments equili-
brium. This is something which a project orientation cannot accomp-
lish. The arguments in favour of additional programme assistance
are therefore compelling. It is perhaps also worth stressing in this
connection that programme assistance would by no means reduce
the need for sound project evaluation. If anything, it would increase
this need since it would be necessary to look comprehensively at all
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of the recipient's projects and to appraise the capacity and abilities
of the recipient-country agencies that will handle the implementation
and financing of the projects.
There has fortunately been increasing recognition on the part of
donors and multilateral agencies of some of the limitations of project
financing and the merits of and need for additional programme
financing in a number of countries. The various aid consortia and
consultative groups convened under the auspices of the World Bank
(IBRD) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OE CD) have been influential in this respect. They have
furnished a forum in which the provision and design of the resources
of the donor countries and international agencies can be brought
more effectively to bear in the fulfillment of the capabilities and
needs of the L D Cs.
Tied aid2
The emphasis on bilateralism and project financing has come in-
creasingly to embrace the tying of aid by country source and end
use. Thus, it has been estimated that during 1961-3 about two-thirds
of the gross bilateral assistance of D A C member countries was
contractually tied or otherwise limited.3 This proportion may
actually be higher now in view especially of the more comprehensive
tying measures instituted since that time especially in the United
States.
Aid-tying restrictions have political roots in the legislative pro-
cesses in individual countries. These restrictions have been sought
not only for administrative reasons but perhaps also to demonstrate
that aid meant increases in the country's exports. The increased use
of suppliers' credits and other devices to stimulate exports has
furthered tying. But in recent years, especially on the part of the
United States, aid tying has been extensively broadened because of
balance-of-payments difficulties.
The object of United States tying restrictions is to curtail sharply
the expenditure of aid proceeds by recipient countries on the export
goods of the other more advanced countries. The reason behind this
is that when the exports of these countries increased, they would be
likely to accumulate additional foreign exchange reserves at the
expense of the United States rather than to increase their imports
from this country. It should be clear therefore that aid tying on
balance-of-payments grounds is a reflection of the inadequacy of
the workings of the international-financial mechanism of adjust-
ment for the restoration of payments equilibrium among the more
advanced countries.
Since the United States is the main country which has instituted
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tying on such a broad scale, it is instructive to consider briefly the
effects this has had on its balance-of-payments. Thus, Bhagwati, on
the basis of some information supplied by Alan Strout, has estimated
that aid tying in 1966 may have 'saved' the United States as much as
$1.1 billion, which was equal to 39 per cent of total procurement in
that year.4 Bhagwati further estimated that the elimination of tying
by all the DA c member countries simultaneously would have resulted
in an estimated loss in export proceeds for the United States of
about $800 million in 1963 and $688 million in 1964.5
These estimates of the foreign-exchange savings of tied aid must
of course be interpreted with caution. This is because they were
based upon an assumed proportion of 30 per cent representing the
balance-of-payments 'gains' from aid tying, and upon the further
assumption that untying aid would redistribute exports according to
the market shares of DAc countries actually observed in 1962-4.
The fact remains nevertheless that the foreign-exchange savings of
tied United States aid are substantial and that the removal of tying
would result therefore in a significant increase in the United States
balance-of-payments deficit. The untying of aid under present con-
ditions would have to be predicated therefore on multilateral action,
with the surplus countries especially untying more than their pro-
portionate share of total aid.
Looked at from the standpoints of the world as a whole and the
L D cs in particular, there is a definite presumption that aid tying is
an inefficient policy. This inefficiency will not be especially serious
when the donor country can supply a broad range of goods at or
close to world market prices. But the costs of inefficiency will become
more substantial as the donor country narrows its range of available
goods, becomes less competitive internationally and tolerates explicit
or implicit collusion by domestic producers in setting prices for aid-
financed goods. The disadvantages to the recipient will vary also
depending on its availability of other external resources besides the
tied aid. The more limited these other resources, the greater will be
the reliance of the recipient on the tied aid and the greater therefore
the possibility that this aid may not accord well with the recipient's
needs and development priorities.
The excess costs of aid tying will of course vary from country to
country. Unfortunately, there is only scattered information on what
these costs may actually be in particular circumstances. It is difficult
therefore to reach any general conclusion as to the most likely order
of magnitude. Thus, for example, Bhagwati has analysed the spreads
of bids on competitive tendering from 20 World Bank loans and 3
ID A credits amounting to a total of $200'9 million in the years
1960-6. He measured the percentage of potential excess cost as the
FINANCIAL ISSUES IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 53
ratio of the difference between 'high bids' and 'successful bids' to
'successful bids'. His results indicated an average potential excess
cost of 49-3 per cent, and 'that over 31 per cent of the value of
contracts awarded ... were characterized by potential excess cost of
over 50 per cent, and 62-9 per cent of the value of contracts awarded
were characterized by potential excess cost of over 30 per cent.'6
In his pioneering study of aid tying in Pakistan, Ul Haq arrived
at an estimate of 12 per cent of excess cost on the basis of a loss of
$60 million out of a total annual aid flow of $500 million in 1961-3.
This was a relatively low figure which U1 Haq attributed to Pakistan's
flexibility in seeking alternative suppliers and the relatively low pro-
portion of tied aid to total aid.7 In a study of six projects involving
transport and harbour equipment undertaken in Iran in 1966-7,
Eshag estimated an average excess cost of about 15 per cent on
disbursements of $18-9 million. However, since the excess cost on
dams and electric-power projects was estimated to be appreciably
smaller, Eshag concluded that the average rate of excess cost on
total tied aid received by Iran in 1966-7 may have been 10 per cent
or less. He attributed Iran's ability to keep down these costs to its
success in diversifying aid sources, the negotiation of untied global
credit agreements, and the financing of parts of projects with its own
foreign-exchange recourses.8
Many more case studies of recipient countries are needed before
we could say whether in general the excess costs of aid tying are
greater or less than, for example, 10-15 per cent. But whatever the
correct percentage, it is clear that the nominal aid figures may sub-
stantially overstate the real value of the aid being transferred to the
recipient countries.9 Thus, projects undertaken with tied aid in
recipient countries may turn out to be inefficient unless their costs
can be written down or some other adjustments made. Moreover, to
the extent that the tied aid is furnished in loan rather than grant
form, repayment may possibly result in returning to the lender more
in real value than was actually received. This may be the case even if
the loan is provided on soft terms.10 Finally, it does not seem
completely equitable when loans are tied to ask the recipient to
make repayments in freely convertible foreign exchange.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that really fundamental
progress in removing aid-tying restrictions depends upon needed
reforms in the international monetary system. Making the system
more stable by reducing or eliminating the role of the dollar as a
reserve currency and establishing a more effective balance-of-pay-
ments mechanism of adjustment would obviate the necessity of
deficit countries, the United States especially, to resort to such
defensive policies as aid tying. There may also be a need in this
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connection, as will be noted below, for the more advanced countries
to reconsider some of their policies of export promotion.
According to the Chairman of the DA C: 'There cannot be said to
have been any appreciable progress towards more liberality in aid
tying during recent years." Given the pressing needs of the LDCs
and the present uncertainties concerning international monetary re-
form, it may consequently be more fruitful at this stage to deal with
the problem piecemeal by seeking to develop a series of individual
measures, all with the same purpose of adding flexibility to and
reducing the costs of aid procurement to the LD Cs.
Surplus commodity aid
Mention has been made in our earlier discussion of the substantial
aid transfers of surplus agricultural commodities by the United
States especially in connection with its Public Law 480 programmes.
The humanitarian aspects of these programmes are certainly
laudable in their goals to ameliorate famine and other emergency
conditions and in helping to raise consumption standards in many
developing countries. The sales of surplus commodities for local
currencies under Title i of Public Law 480 have also provided sub-
stantial programme-finance benefits to the recipient countries by
enabling them to divert scarce foreign exchange to capital-goods
imports, to help control inflation, and in some cases to utilize the
surplus commodities in conjunction with the expansion of domestic
investment.
There have, however, been certain negative influences arising from
these programmes in particular instances. Thus, sales for local
currency of wheat especially may have caused some trade diversion
to the disadvantage of competing exporters, among which were such
developing countries as Argentina and the rice exporters of south-
east Asia. Also, local currency sales may have depressed the domestic
price structure of competing crops, thereby creating disincentives to
increases in production and productivity in the recipient country.
These disincentives may have been exacerbated, finally, if continued
reliance on surplus-commodity imports resulted in the diversion of
government policies in the recipient countries away from needed
improvements in their agricultural sector.
It is especially noteworthy that in recent years there have been
substantial increases in the world demand for grains and a definite
trend in United States domestic agricultural policy towards lower
price supports which has resulted in significant reductions in surplus
stocks. The demand for imported foodstuffs will no doubt continue
to increase in the future in LD Cs which are experiencing difficulties in
expanding domestic agricultural output. There may also be a large
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potential demand intermittently particularly in the centrally planned
economies as a result of vagaries in production due to unfavourable
weather conditions. If such increases in demand come at a time
when there are relatively poor crops in some of the important L D C
producing countries, the resulting squeeze might threaten the con-
tinuity of this type of aid. It deserves mention, furthermore, that the
United States has amended its Public Law 480 programme to reduce
Title I sales for local currencies in favour of new Title iv arrange-
ments which provide for dollar sales. Finally, we can take note of
the World Grains Agreement negotiated in mid-1967, during the
Kennedy Round, which will involve an annual contribution by the
industrialized countries in kind or currency equivalent of 4-5 million
tons of wheat to a multilateral food-aid programme.
When we consider the implications of all the foregoing considera-
tions, there are two that stand out especially. The first involves the
increasing reliance of many LD Cs on imported foodstuffs. This is an
issue which must on the whole be dealt with in these countries
through programmes aimed at stimulating domestic agricultural out-
put and restraining the rate of population growth. Such programmes
take of course a long time to implement, which means that the
dependency of many countries on food imports is likely to continue.
The second implication is whether the LD CS will be able to satisfy
their food import needs without a substantial drain on their foreign-
exchange resources in view of the changes noted in the potential
availability of surplus foodstuffs and in the switch from local cur-
rency to dollar sales on the part of the United States. The switch to
dollar sales means that the grant equivalent of the United States
food-aid programme will be reduced and the potential debt-servicing
needs of the L D Cs increased. It may be, however, that the new multi-
lateral food-aid arrangements will compensate for this change. The
possibility of relatively large transitory increases in commercial
demands for imports due to crop fluctuations must still be reckoned
with by the L D Cs, however. Such occurrences might be alleviated by
stockpiling in the LD Cs themselves or by means of special financial
arrangements extended by the donor countries for LD C imports.
Loan terms, suppliers' credits, and problems of debt servicing
The adoption by the DA C in July 1965 of the Recommendation on
Financial Terms and Conditions marked an important departure in
the aid field by establishing numerical targets for aid terms against
which the performances of DA C members could be compared.12
According to the 1967 Review (p. 81), in 1966 seven of the fifteen
DAC members met the grant test (Australia, Norway, Belgium,
France, Canada, Netherlands, and Sweden); the United States and
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United Kingdom complied with two of the alternative provisions;
Denmark and Germany complied with one of the alternative provi-
sions; and Japan, Portugal, Austria, and Italy did not comply with
any of the provisions.
An issue connected closely with that of the average loan terms is
the substantial variation which exists in these terms among the
various D A C members. This applies not only to official aid com-
mitments but to an even greater extent to both government guaran-
teed and private non-guaranteed export-credit financing (i.e., sup-
pliers' credits). Thus, it was bearing in mind the significant dis-
parities that exist both in general and with respect to particular re-
cipient countries that the aforementioned recommendation called
upon D A C members to harmonize and to soften their terms of
assistance where appropriate. The importance of this recommenda-
tion lies in the possibility that, if significant disparities are permitted
to exist, the spectacle of the harder terms elsewhere may make it
difficult for some countries to soften further or perhaps even to
maintain existing terms. Moreover, inequities may be created if the
hard terms of some donors pre-empt the debt servicing capacity of
recipients at the expense of other donors that have provided assis-
tance on soft terms.
This last point may indeed be the crux of the matter of the debt-
servicing problems of many LD Cs, especially as far as terms of sup-
pliers' credits are concerned. Thus, it is apparent that the debt-
service liabilities on guaranteed private export credits are quite sub-
stantial for a number of LD cs. This has been due mainly to the rapid
growth in credits of more than five years' duration as the industria-
lized countries have tried to outdo one another in liberalizing credit
terms in order to expand their exports and obtain footholds in the
markets of many L D cs.13 It may not be an exaggeration therefore to
state that the need in many cases for softer terms on public assistance
is to help offset the hard terms that many developing countries must
pay on their suppliers' credits.
The statement just made should by no means be construed to
denigrate the important role of suppliers' credits in the financing of
trade. Nor should this statement be taken as a rationalization which
is intended to overlook the mistakes in economic policy in some
L D cs that may result in financial crises. The situation is one never-
theless that the LD Cs cannot cope adequately with themselves given
their pressing needs for capital and their inability to foresee clearly
future debt problems or to exercise effective restraint over vested
interests, both domestic and foreign.
As far as the donors are concerned, they should consider that they
may all be engaged in a game that nobody wins on balance, although
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private interests may gain when suppliers' credits are converted into
public assistance as part of a debt re-scheduling exercise. The time
may be at hand therefore to call for restraint among donor countries
in extending suppliers' credits to countries that are already over-
burdened with debt.14 Serious attention should also be directed
within the donor countries themselves to obtaining more effective
co-ordination of the activities of their development-lending and
export-credit institutions and thus to reduce the inconsistencies in
policies and practices which presently exist.
All debt-servicing problems are by no means associated with sub-
stantial accumulation of suppliers' credits, however, for there are
some LDCs (e.g., India and Turkey) in which debt-servicing prob-
lems stem in large measure from their accumulated official develop-
ment-assistance liabilities. In these cases the problems are due more
generally to the structural inadequacies of long-run savings and
foreign-exchange earnings.15 The consideration of debt rescheduling
should be made to accord therefore with the long-run development
criteria that may be most appropriate in these cases for the fulfil-
ment of their assistance needs.
II. THE CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES
Aid provided by the centrally planned economies is characteristically
bilateral. It is designed to finance projects and is tied to procurement
in the source country. It is common for repayments to be made in
kind in the form of the recipient's traditional export goods or
occasionally through the export of goods produced from the aid-
financed project itself. The foreign-exchange problems of debt
servicing familiar in relationships with the developed market econo-
mies thus do not arise directly. A further noteworthy feature of the
aid activities of the centrally planned economies is the extent to
which their assistance embraces all phases of the development of
projects through to their final completion. This includes the pro-
vision of technical services and the training of local personnel to
work on and subsequently to take over the operation of the com-
pleted projects. Such practices, if successful, may avoid some of the
undesirable effects that utilization of suppliers' credits has provided
on occasion in individual recipient countries.
Reliance on the reciprocal tying of aid stems from the concept of
'mutual benefits' which is a principle associated with the aid pro-
grammes of the centrally planned economies.16 This principle has
worked out in actuality to encompass both the economic and politi-
cal benefits that may accrue to the donor and recipient, although the
sharing of the benefits may not be symmetrical. The tying of aid to
procurement in the source country has been necessitated by the need
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to marshal limited supplies of foreign exchange to obtain essential
imports. Thus, in this light there would be no aid at all unless it
were tied. Aside from foreign-exchange problems, the reason for
tying aid on a bilateral basis has been the lack until recently of the
convertibility of the currencies of the individual Bloc economies
vis-a-vis one another. It may be mentioned finally that the practices
of tying have been consonant with the physical planning orientation
of the donor countries.
The emphasis on bilateralism, project assistance, and the tying of
aid would seem to have the same drawbacks mentioned in our
earlier discussion, except perhaps for the debt-servicing characteris-
tics which have been noted. There is nevertheless an important degree
of uncertainty present in the real loan terms. This arises from the
fact that the prices of the aid goods and services and of the goods
designated for repayment are based on current world-market prices
at the time the aid agreement is negotiated. While these agreements
contain safeguards against general inflation and devaluation, they do
not offer any guarantee against changes in world prices. The con-
sequence is that if substantial price fluctuations occur, the effect
could be to alter significantly the real cost of the loan to both parties.
Once this is recognized, the advantage of reciprocal tying becomes
somewhat less certain unless there are other compensating factors
involved such as those discussed above. This would suggest that it
might be fruitful to explore other financing arrangements for repay-
ment that could be operated more flexibly. Such arrangements
might now be more feasible than formerly in view of the multilateral-
payments balancing that may become more widely used among the
centrally planned economies.
The question of the terms of aid of the centrally planned econo-
mies also deserves brief comment in connection with the previously
discussed debt-servicing problems of some developing countries on
account of their outstanding official loan liabilities. The point at
issue here is that it is immaterial whether debts are serviced in kind
or in foreign exchange. For in both cases, it is clear that the real
budgetary cost of debt servicing may be equally burdensome. The
centrally planned and the developed market economies thus have a
joint interest in debt rescheduling in instances where debt servicing
has risen to the point where the development effort is threatened with
interruption and retardation.
III. MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS
As mentioned earlier, the influences of the multilateral institutions
go far beyond merely the recorded magnitudes of their lending and
related activities. What is noteworthy in recent years is that their
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policies and practices have continued to evolve in the light of chang-
ing conditions in both donor and recipient countries, and that they
have been in the forefront of new departures in the field of assistance.
The world bank
Project financing has long been and will continue to be the main
business of the World Bank. However, as the need for additional
programme assistance has become increasingly clear, the Bank has
allocated a larger amount of its resources for this purpose in particu-
lar recipient countries. There are also indications of a greater willing-
ness to finance some proportion of the local costs of projects when
the recipient evidently cannot shoulder the entire task. With the
coming into existence of the International Development Association
(ID A), the Bank has acquired much greater flexibility in establishing
the terms of lending by being able to provide funds on blended Bank
and IDA terms. Bank influence on the terms of lending has been
evidenced further in the joint-financing ventures which it has under-
taken in co-operation with donor countries. Finally, the Bank's
activities in promoting aid consortia and consultative groups have
already borne important results both in increasing the flow of
assistance and seeking its more effective utilization.
One of the long established policies of Bank lending has been to
direct its financing by means of international competitive bidding to
the cheapest sources of supply. Bank financing tied to particular
source countries has therefore been ruled out of consideration.
While this is a policy with which there can hardly be any quarrel, it
has become increasingly clear that the Bank may have to adapt its
policy in the light of the conditions which donor countries, the
United States in particular, may attach on balance-of-payments
grounds to a replenishment and expansion of IDA resources. If it
turns out in fact that future pledges to multilateral agencies will con-
tain tying conditions, it will then be imperative for the Bank to
develop machinery to administer these pledges so that the excess
costs of tying to the recipient countries will be kept at a minimum."
By the same token, the Bank might possibly devise ways to exert its
influence on aid tying generally to achieve the end just mentioned.
Regional development banks
Another recent innovation which promises to become increasingly
important is the organization of regional development banks. The
Inter-American Development Bank, which has been in operation
since 1960, has already had a significant impact on most aspects of
development assistance in Latin America. While the difficulties faced
by the Asian and African Development Banks will perhaps yield
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less readily to solution since the member countries are not as highly
developed as those in Latin America, the influence of these banks
will nevertheless be important.
The operating characteristics and problems of the regional
development banks will in many, but not all, ways parallel those of
the World Bank. These banks can therefore profit greatly from
World Bank experience and advice. But in catering to the special
needs and problems of their regions, they may be able to fulfill a
role which otherwise would have gone unplayed. This may involve
not only lending activities which cut across national lines, but also
activities which will foster the closer integration of these economies.
The regional development banks may thus raise problems of aid
terms and debt servicing which have a different order of dimension
than the more familiar ones which have been considered to date.
Debt servicing and rescheduling
Brief mention may be made finally of the activities of the inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and such ad hoc entities as the
'Hague', 'Paris' and other creditors' 'clubs' in their concern with
debt servicing and debt renegotiation. The majority of these activi-
ties has thus been in connection with L DCS that have run into serious
balance-of-payments difficulties as a consequence often of lax and
improper domestic-economic policies and an associated accumula-
tion of short and medium-term commercial credits which have come
due all at once. It has been common practice to approach each case
of debt rescheduling on an ad hoc basis with fairly short terms and
to place great emphasis on the need for domestic reforms to prevent
another crisis from occurring. This approach can be defended on
the grounds that it is important to avoid creating any presumption
that debt rescheduling is something that a recipient country can take
for granted.
There is of course much to be said for the view just stated. What
may be overlooked, however, is the point mentioned earlier con-
cerning the contribution to the crisis which the more advanced
countries may have furnished, especially by their competition in
export credits. Some more systematic checks upon the export-credit
activities of the more advanced countries may thus help to nip future
crises in the bud. The IMF can certainly perform a useful service in
this respect through their annual reviews. It may also be fitting in
addition to reiterate in the present context the need for more syste-
matic review of cases of impending debt-service problems arising
from long-term public assistance loans.
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IV. RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
The discussion would not be complete without a few words con-
cerning the effective utilization of development assistance by the
recipient countries. Many recipient countries have unfortunately not
yet reached the point of being able to cope adequately with the
somewhat bewildering array of national, international, and private
institutions and mechanisms through which development assistance
flows. The problems of recipients are often exacerbated furthermore
by the lack of co-ordination among the individual sectors which carry
on more or less independent activities involving development finance.
As a consequence of these deficiencies in administration, it is
possible that in many countries the costs of assistance may be
higher than they would otherwise be. This may be true particularly
where tied aid and suppliers' credits are involved and the recipient
has not had or taken the opportunity to shop around. Also, the
allocation of assistance within the economy may be less efficient as
new investment is expanded more in some sectors than in others
without adequate consideration of alternative rates of return.
What is required in recipient countries under the circumstances
described may be the centralization of responsibility for handling
all of the aspects of development finance. It would be possible in this
way to build up a staff of trained personnel in each country that
would acquire the expertise which is necessary to analyse the various
aid offers, negotiate financial terms, provide the link between foreign
and domestic-credit institutions, and so on. Some recipient countries
have already achieved considerable sophistication in these matters
and their experiences and organizations might be studied fruitfully
by others. This is also an area of activity in which technical assistance
provided particularly through the World Bank and regional develop-
ment banks could be of great value.
V. NEW DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICIES
It is clear from the survey just completed that there are many difficult
problems arising out of existing development assistance policies and
practices. Perhaps the most pressing are the problems associated
with aid tying, competition among the more advanced countries in
the extension of suppliers' credits, and debt rescheduling. Some
possibilities for alleviation of these problems have already been
suggested or implied in the preceding discussion. It may be useful,
however, to spell out these possibilities in somewhat greater detail.
Tied aid
The unilateral reduction of aid tying is a step which donor countries
are reluctant to take under present international financial conditions.
62 ROBERT M. STERN
This is understandable for countries with balance-of-payments
deficits like the United States since unilateral untying might make
the deficit larger. But there is no reason why unilateral untying
could not be carried out by surplus countries. Of course, such a
policy would probably not have immediate effects because of lags in
the commitment and disbursement of aid. It is likely, moreover, that
since the international competitive position of the deficit country
may have deteriorated through time, that country would be forced
as part of its balance of payments adjustment to institute measures
to improve its position. The point of the unilateral action by the
surplus country is therefore to build the effects of untying into the
balance .of payments adjustment process. Once the country with the
initial deficit has moved into equilibrium or into a surplus position,
it could then reciprocate the untying action. Aid tying would thus
be eliminated gradually provided that the more advanced countries
agreed that they would not reinstitute it in the event of future
deficits.
Multilateral untying might be considered as an alternative to
unilateral untying. But to make it acceptable to deficit countries, it
would be necessary to ask the surplus countries to assume a greater
share of the commitments. Following the precedent set in the DA c
Recommendation on Financial Terms and Conditions, consideration
might be given to establishing numerical targets for untying which
took into account the balance-of-payments positions of the member
countries. This would have the advantages noted above plus pro-
viding a standard against which member country performance could
be compared.
If it turns out that movement along the foregoing lines is either
not feasible or that it would work too slowly, the next best approach
would be to seek a series of partial measures, all of which would be
designed to operate in the direction of minimizing the excess costs
of tying. Such measures might include: (1) subjecting bilateral flows
to multilateral review through the activities and organs of the World
Bank and the regional development banks; (2) improvements in
donor-country aid practices; (3) multilateral purchasing arrange-
ments; and (4) more effective utilization of aid resources in recipient
countries.
1. Multilateralizing influences
There are already ways in existence by which the World Bank and
the regional development banks could further promote a multi-
lateralizing influence on bilateral flows. One of these is through the
review process of aid consortia and consultative groups in which the
immediate and planned future assistance needs of the recipient
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countries are topics for discussion among all the interested parties.
Another possibility is through a more widespread use of joint-
financing ventures which align the skill and reputation in project
analysis and the financial resources of the multilateral institutions
with those of individual donor countries. A third way would be to
provide some type of international project-costing service that could
assist developing countries even when a project was to be financed
bilaterally.
It was mentioned above that it is likely that increasing pressure
may be brought to bear upon the World Bank especially to alter its
longstanding policy against restricted aid commitments. This will be
the case if balance-of-payments considerations continue to have a
direct bearing upon the foreign-aid programme of the- United
States, the single largest donor. As noted, the question of aid tying
has come up already in connection with the proposed replenishment
of iD A resources. Since it would be undesirable and even inequitable
to excuse a donor country from its aid commitments on balance-of-
payments grounds, aid tying might therefore have to be condoned.
The problem then would be to utilize this tied procurement in
order to minimize its inconvenience and the impact of its higher
costs on recipient countries. This will be more easily accomplished
the more co-operative the donor is in providing a broad list of
commodities and services for aid purposes. Since the World Bank
would still presumably subject all of its projects to international
competitive bidding, it would be in a good position to adjust the
volume and terms of its overall resources, including those that were
tied, to approximate as closely as possible the cheapest available
supply prices for the given investment. This would admittedly be
more cumbersome than its regular practices, but there may be no
way to avoid it under present balance-of-payments circumstances.
2. Improvements in donor-country aid practices
From the standpoint of the donor countries themselves, there are a
number of possible measures that they could undertake individually.
In cases where it is not already done, administrative procedures
could be instituted to oversee the placement of bids domestically
and to take steps to assure competitive prices of aid-financed goods.
As was mentioned earlier, the question here is not only one of the
donor's price quotations being relatively high because of the loss of
international competitiveness. Such quotations may be high also
because there is a lack of competitiveness in the domestic economy
as well and the suppliers in question are able to increase their prices
without fear of losing the sale which is to be tied in any case.
Assuming that the recipient has no other alternatives, this double
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tying might therefore impose on it a substantial burden unless the
donor country were to take corrective action.
The corrective action of the donor in this case might involve re-
questing its suppliers to lower their bids to internationally competi-
tive levels, or the donor could adjust the composition of its aid in
order to permit a wider choice of goods at competitive prices. If
neither of these alternatives was feasible, the donor might be
requested to consider releasing the aid funds in question to less
costly supply sources in other more advanced countries. However,
this might create the problem mentioned earlier concerning the
extent to which these other countries would use the increase in
foreign exchange to expand imports or to augment their interna-
tional reserves. The more that particular countries trade normally
with one another, the less net drain there might be on the donor's
balance of payments. It is possible under these circumstances there-
fore that the donor might specify certain other supplying countries
in which procurement would be permitted when warranted by cost
considerations. If these other countries also happened to be in
balance-of-payments deficit, an action of this kind could be equili-
brating, although it might possibly be objected to on the grounds
that it was discriminatory in nature.
Corrective action by the donor could also be taken by making a
special grant to the recipient in order to absorb the excess costs due
to tying. Or consideration could be given, following the practice of
the centrally planned economies and the associated UNCTAD
Recommendation A. IV. 4, to tie loan repayments to goods produced
in the recipient country. The advantage of a special grant would be
to insure that the nominal and real value of the resources made
available to the recipient were equivalent. Reverse tying would help
to ease the transfer problem of loan repayments. But it is not clear
whether the recipient would be relieved of the extra costs of tied aid
unless the goods specified for repayment in kind were valued at
higher than commercial levels. This might have an important draw-
back from the donor's standpoint, however, if import of the goods
in question displaced domestic production, as could be the case with
simple manufactures.
There is also the problem noted earlier that projects financed with
tied aid may turn out to be relatively inefficient. Thus, even though
a part of the recipient's production was earmarked for repayment
purposes, possibly at more favourable than existing market terms,
this would only be a partial offset to the inefficiency involved in the
project as a whole. It would thus be most desirable if the recipient
were able to utilize aid to finance its projects at minimum costs and
to realize income both at home and abroad through the sale of
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efficiently produced goods and services. A special grant to compen-
sate for the excess costs of tying would thus be preferable to reverse
tying if it permitted the excess costs in question to be written off.
3. Multilateral purchasing arrangements
A logical extension of the release procedure mentioned in the pre-
ceding section might be to develop triangular arrangements in which
the donor would specify that its aid be used for procurement in
another presumably low-cost country against an equivalent amount
of purchases by this other country in the donor's market. The main
difficulty with this idea is that it would present the same kind of
problem as in direct tying. That is, if the triangular arrangement
resulted in the other country switching some of its regular imports
from the donor to a different supply source, the donor's balance of
payments would be affected adversely to some extent.
An alternative which is similar in principle to the triangular
arrangement would be for a donor that was a member of a regional
economic grouping to permit the recipient to use the donor's assis-
tance in whatever one or more of the other member countries that
happened to be the cheapest source of supply.18 Such a proposal
would work best if the comparative cost structures differed signifi-
cantly among the member countries themselves, and especially if
they carried on a major part of their trade with one another and
followed common policies, including multilateral payments balanc-
ing at least within the regional grouping.
Of the two major groupings comprising donor countries, the con-
ditions favourable to multilateral purchasing arrangements would
appear to be approximated more closely by the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (COME CON) rather than by the European
Economic Community (EEC). This is because the EEC members
carry on a substantial part of their trade with outside countries. The
EEC members also do not follow as yet completely uniform domestic
and international economic policies. In view of these considerations
and the fact that they require payments imbalances to be settled
mainly in dollars and gold, multilateral purchasing arrangements
could result in undesired balance-of-payments effects both within the
EEC itself and with respect to outside countries.
In exploring the feasibility of multilateral purchasing arrange-
ments within COME CON, consideration might also be given more
generally to multilateral balancing vis-a-vis individual L D cs. These
arrangements could conceivably be broadened to permit greater
flexibility in the spending by LDCS of bilateral balances within
COME CON and by COME CON members within particular LD Cs.
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4. More effective utilization of aid by recipients
It is obviously in their own interest for the recipient countries to
allocate their foreign-exchange and foreign-assistance resources as
efficiently as possible. This is not only a question of the careful
preparation and implementation of projects, but also one of co-
ordination among the various sectors and institutions concerned
with development and its financing in each country. The more
successful the recipients are in locating the cheapest sources of
supply for the financing of their development needs, the better off
they will be. Such success may admittedly make the aid-tying
arrangements of the donor countries more difficult to administer on
account of the substitutions which the recipients may arrange in
their imports both as to composition and source. This process
should be looked upon, however, as a balancing rather than a conflict
of interests between recipient and donor. It will therefore require
both co-operation and understanding.
Suppliers' credits
The problems created by the increased reliance on suppliers' credits
by many LDCS must be recognized to be the joint responsibility of
these countries themselves, the more advanced countries, and the
appropriate multilateral institutions. It is difficult to formulate
general principles to deal with these problems because of the wide
variations in individual circumstances which exist in both lending
and borrowing countries. There is agreement nevertheless on the
desirability in general for L D cs to set realistic limits on the amount
of credit which they can hope to service when the time comes, for
the more advanced countries to co-operate in the exchange of infor-
mation and jointly to establish norms for credit terms and amounts
to suit the debt position and needs of individual borrowing countries,
and for the multilateral institutions, the World Bank and IMF in
particular, to keep continually in touch with all parties concerned
and to use their influence in dealing with problems as they may
arise.
The annual IMF consultations and the periodic meetings of the
various aid consortia and consultative groups should serve to keep
these matters under continual review. More concretely, the possibili-
ties should be explored of a more systematic linking of World Bank
financing with that of equipment credits which are largely a national
affair at present. The Bank's expertise in project evaluation and
knowledge of individual country needs would be brought to bear
upon the technical suitability and credit terms on which the equip-
ment was to be financed. This combination of Bank finance and
equipment credits, which normally are government guaranteed,
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would be advantageous moreover to the extent that it enhanced
the marketability of the securities underwritten for the given
financing.
Debt rescheduling
The question of debt rescheduling is also one that is best dealt with
in the context of the situation facing individual countries. As was
mentioned earlier, most of the cases of debt rescheduling have been
handled thus far on an ad hoc basis. However, since the debt-
servicing problems of a number of borrowing countries are becom-
ing increasingly apparent,'9 it might be worthwhile to determine if
any criteria can be formulated by the lending countries which will
be helpful in coping with these problems. Consideration of criteria
might include a review of the reschedulings that have taken place
in recent years, both as to overall terms and the distribution of the
sharing of burdens by individual lending countries. It might also be
fruitful to carry out some theoretical exercises under assumed con-
ditions in order to examine the impact of various kinds of re-
scheduling, especially when the problem is one of servicing long-run
liabilities rather than one of dealing with the excessive accumulation
of short and medium-term obligations.
There is in addition apparently a need for earlier identification of
impending problems and communication among the interested
parties. This is an area again in which the aforementioned groups
and periodic consultations can be helpful. The IMF in particular
could play an important role in furthering the development of an
advance warning system that would bring problems to the attention
of the lending countries before a crisis stage is reached.
VI. CONCLUSION
The suggestions just made may no doubt appear to be anticlimatic
and possibly open to the criticisms that they are unrealistic and in
any case will not accomplish very much. It can be argued therefore
that what is of the utmost importance is to keep attention focused
on the most pressing issue of all, which is to increase the volume of
assistance to the L D Cs. Thus, the advanced countries should be
badgered about their having continually fallen short of the one per
cent aid target (based on GNP) and that they should take measures
to soften their terms of aid. These countries can be urged, moreover,
to channel more of their assistance through multilateral institutions
and to give serious consideration to new financing arrangements
such as the Horowitz proposal for interest-rate subsidies and the
World Bank scheme for supplementary financing.20 These are
laudable objectives, of course, given the pressing needs of the L D CS
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for capital assistance and import financing and the impending
seriousness of debt-servicing problems in many countries.
The fact remains nevertheless that the donor countries have shown
little or no inclination in recent years towards increasing sub-
stantially the volume of aid flows to the L D Cs. This head-in-the-sand
attitude on the part of the donor countries is to be deplored. Hope-
fully, with the settlement of the Vietnam conflict and the calming
down and eventual reform of the international monetary system,2'
the attitude towards increased aid flows may become more favour-
able. There is no guarantee that this will happen, however, particu-
larly if countries like the United States become preoccupied in
trying to resolve their own domestic problems. In such an event, it
will become imperative to seek greater efficiency in both donor and
recipient countries as far as aid giving and utilization are concerned.
This is admittedly not a very dramatic prospect, but it may represent
the only real choice open in the immediate future.
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